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Introduction:  
 
Despite American economic success, hunger remains a prevailing problem in 
society. Millions of U.S. citizens every year live with insufficient food consumption and 
lack proper nutrition. The Economic Research Service recently asserted that in 2007 11.1 
percent of U.S. households had “low food security” status, as defined by family’s reports 
of food-related hardship during the year (Nord, Andrews, and Carlson, 2007). Over 
several decades, food assistance programs have developed to answer this problem. 
However, the efficiency of these programs is questionable. In 2005, 13 million people 
who were eligible for the food stamp program (FSP) did not receive assistance (Maryns, 
2008). In addition, many food banks and pantries are struggling to operate and find the 
donations they need to function (Downey, 2008). 
Given current economic conditions of rising food prices, increase of the working 
poor, and macroeconomic instability, food assistance programs remain vital to millions of 
citizens across the nation. Yet, despite their growing importance and questionable 
competence, there has been little comparative analysis of the two primary producers of 
food assistance, the government via food stamps and the nonprofit sector via food banks. 
Thus, this paper will examine the efficacy of these programs using economic theory. The 
paper will first analyze food assistance through utility theory and a consumer choice 
model. Subsequently, the outcomes of a nonprofit production model will be examined. 
By exploring U.S. food welfare programs through an economic framework, the paper will 
offer some recommendations as to the most effective delivery of food assistance. The 
 3 
paper’s conclusions may also illuminate current weaknesses of food welfare programs in 
America. 
Created in the early 1940s, the FSP1 has been used to alleviate hunger in America. 
According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the FSP, is “... the most critical 
component of the safety net against hunger because it provides basic protection for 
citizens of all ages and house-hold status” (Gunderson, 2007). The aim of the FSP is 
simple; it targets the most needy (lowest income) citizens to increase their food 
consumption. The government distributes food stamps to the poor so they may purchase 
greater quantities of food. Citizens whose incomes fall below a specified level are eligible 
to obtain a certain amount of food assistance. For example, a single person household 
with a gross monthly income of $1,127 is eligible for $176 worth of food stamps (USDA 
1, 2008). The amount of benefits the household receives is called an “allotment”. To 
acquire the allotment amount, the net monthly income of the household is multiplied by 
.3, and the product is then subtracted from the household’s maximum allotment to find 
the total allotment. This is because users of the FSP are expected to spend about 30 
percent of their resources on food2 (USDA 1, 2008). Although food stamps are a welfare 
program, they are not entirely free. To receive the FSP’s benefits, the household or 
individual must file an application form, conduct a face-to-face interview and provide 
verification of important information, such as income and expenses. Applying for the 
FSP also costs the applicant some processing fee, which averaged $10.31 in 1999 
(Maryns, 2008). This description of the FSP is what will be used throughout the paper.  
                                                 
1
 As of Oct. 1, 2008, the FSP has been renamed the “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program” and 
benefit packages have changed. However, this paper will analyze the old name and structure of the FSP. 
2
 Further information may be found at http://www.fns.usda.gov/FSP/applicant_recipients/eligibility.htm.  
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Since the creation of the world’s first food bank in 1967, nonprofit organizations 
(NPO) have been important providers of food assistance. Unlike governmental food 
assistance, NPO have various means of delivering services. Food banks, food pantries, 
soup kitchens and food rescue organizations are all important nonprofit providers of food 
assistance. Given the differing forms nonprofit food assistance can take, a generalized 
definition of nonprofit food provision must be established. For the purpose of this study, 
the term food pantries will refer to all nonprofit food assistance. The food pantry will be 
used as the unit of study because of its importance as a provider of food assistance. As 
seen in Chart 1.A, food pantries are the final distributors of assistance in the Emergency 
Food Assistance System (which helps ensure adequate nutrition for low income 
Americans). Primarily all nonprofit food assistance materializes at local pantries. Thus, 
food pantries are the most predominantly used organization by food assistance 
participants.    
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Chart 1.A – Emergency food assistance provider system* 
 
   *Figure taken from USDA Economic Research Service (June 2002) 
Although varying definitions of food pantries exist, this paper will define food 
pantries as localized distributors of food to low-income individuals or families who meet 
basic income and usage requirements. This is in agreement with the 1980 Farm Bill 
definition of, “a public or private nonprofit organization that distributes food to low 
income and unemployed households including foods from services other than USDA to 
relieve situations of emergencies and distress” (Kentucky Department of Agriculture, 
2008). The food pantry may obtain food or monetary donations from the local 
community, food banks, for-profit firms, wholesalers and retailers. Most food pantries 
rely completely on volunteer staff for the production of services.  
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Literature Review: 
 
 Despite the historical significance of nonprofit and government involvement in 
food assistance, there has been little comparative analysis between the two. Most of the 
existing literature on food pantries lacks theoretical analysis and primarily consists of 
consumer and producer reports.  However, some research has studied important aspects 
of both the FSP and food pantries.3  
 In February of 2008, the Food Research and Action Center (FRAC) reviewed 
important literature regarding barriers to consumers of participating in the FSP. 
According to the report, transaction costs are significant barriers for many eligible 
citizens. The report cited one study that revealed around 60 percent of those eligible for 
food stamps did not apply because the costs of application were too high. The same study 
also concluded that potential applicants who had travel times above 15 minutes showed a 
strong propensity not to apply. In addition to travel times, the report showed the 
importance of implicit time costs. For example, in 1999 the average time necessary to 
complete the application process was around 5 hours. Several applicants took over 12 
hours to complete the process (Maryns, 2008). According to the FRAC, these hours 
represent time applicants could be doing other things, like helping their children with 
schoolwork. Low income citizens, who must struggle through red tape to receive their 
assistance and then have to deal with difficulties in using the assistance, may feel it is not 
worth the struggle. This would explain a survey cited by the report in which 86 percent of 
state food stamp directors said a major reason why seniors do not participate in the FSP 
                                                 
3
 Although a majority of food stamp research focuses on the program’s inability to increase food 
expenditures, this paper will not focus on this issue.  
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was that the effort needed to apply outweighed the benefits (Maryns, 2008). The FRAC 
also reported that application fees, however small, may be daunting to households 
experiencing difficult circumstances.  
Another area of research has focused on the stigma of food assistance. A working 
definition of “stigma” was provided by Edward Bird in the paper, “Exploring the Stigma 
of Food Stamps”. The paper described welfare stigma as the lower utility that some 
recipients feel when they receive welfare support, such as food stamps. The “stigmatized” 
receive lower utility because they are embarrassed, do not want their children to be seen 
as poor, or feel their societal status and reputation may be tarnished (Bird, 1996). 
Although many of those in need swallow their pride and engage in the FSP, a significant 
number of eligible citizens choose not to participate because of stigma (Eisinger, 1998). 
A study in 2004 by Barlett and Burstein showed that 44 percent of eligible participants 
cited stigma as a reason for not applying or using the FSP (Mayrns, 2008). The same 
study also documented the effects of stigma on food stamp users. According to the 
survey, food stamp users reported being treated disrespectfully when using food stamps 
in a store. This led a number of recipients to avoid telling others they were receiving food 
stamps and go through extra effort to shop at a store where nobody knew them. Another 
survey by America’s Second Harvest (a domestic hunger-relief organization) showed that 
between 7-10 percent of eligible citizens stated they never applied for welfare benefits 
because of stigma. (Maryns, 2008) According to the research, a certain stigma does exist 
in the minds of many needy people. This stigma has historically been strong enough to 
make eligible citizens find an alternative source of meeting their needs (Eisinger, 1998).  
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The negative impact of stigma on participation in the FSP may have led to 
government development of electronic benefit transfer cards (EBT). EBT allow FSP 
users to store and access their benefits like a credit of debit card when purchasing 
groceries. This method of welfare delivery is thought to increase ease of use and limit 
misprinting costs (Maryns, 2008). According to the FRAC, EBT may also diminish 
stigma. A North Carolina survey in 2001 found that 12 percent of FSP participants liked 
the privacy EBT offered. In addition, a 1994 Maryland report showed that 83 percent of 
low-income consumers preferred using EBT, partly because they reduced perceived 
embarrassment and stigma (Maryns, 2008). Despite these findings, there is no concrete 
evidence that EBT increase participation rates or substantially reduce stigma (Maryns, 
2008). 
 Previous papers have shown the development of food pantries and their 
importance in dealing with national hunger. Daponte and Bade explain how nonprofit 
involvement in food assistance was created to satisfy an unmet demand. They suggest 
that there has been a distinct shift in household perception of food assistance in America. 
This shift can be seen by an increased reliance on nonprofit food assistance. According to 
Daponte and Bade only 36 percent of households dependent on a food pantry use food 
stamps and one third of food pantry users have never even applied for food stamps 
(Daponte, 2007). About one-twelfth of Americans received food from a pantry at least 
once in 2005.   
Food banks and pantries uphold a new aspect of food assistance which is hard to 
find in government assistance. Nonprofits add an element of service. Food pantries 
operate almost exclusively with volunteer laborers, who give their time to help others. 
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Food pantries can produce service with a smile and provide a feeling to those in need that 
someone cares. A Washington State consumer report which questioned pantry users 
about their satisfaction with service quality found a high level of contentment. In the 
areas of service almost 70 percent of respondents gave the highest rating of satisfaction 
(Pierce, L. 2008).  
However, food pantries and banks have several weaknesses. The California 
Association of Food Banks notes many issues facing nonprofit food assistance. 
Increasing demand for services, declining donations, higher food prices, and lack of 
short-term federal support has stretched many food banks and pantries thin. (CAFB 2008) 
Given food pantry’s reliance on donations and stable prices, short run negative economic 
shocks can greatly disrupt the ability of nonprofit food organizations (NPFO) to produce 
critical services. The sensitivity of NPFO to times of economic weakness has been the 
focus of many recent news stories. An April 2008 feature article by the Washington Post 
is an example of such journalism. According to the article, food banks are being stretched 
thin as requests for food assistance have increased by 30 percent since last year (Downey, 
2008). A simultaneously shrinking donation base has created a compounding effect on 
food banks and pantries. Donations have decreased as farmers are shipping more of their 
goods abroad, and grocery stores are diminishing the amount and frequency of their 
donations (Downey, 2008). A recent trend by grocery stores of selling “scratch-and-dent 
goods” to discount stores instead of giving them to reclamation companies, who donate to 
food banks, has been the primary cause of smaller grocery donations (Downey, 2008).  
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Economic Theory and Results: 
 
To analyze U.S. food assistance through a consumer choice framework, it is 
important to establish the economic nature of food. Accurately viewing food stamp and 
pantry use from the consumer’s perspective depends on understanding whether food is a 
normal or inferior good. If food is a normal good, as the consumer’s income increases the 
quantity demanded for that good will rise. If food is an inferior good, the opposite would 
occur and consumers would want less food as their incomes increased. Using data from 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, a simple Engle curve (Chart 1) shows food is a 
normal good. In recent history, as U.S. household’s disposable income (income after 
taxes) has risen, the amount of food expenditures has likewise increased.  
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This Engel consumption curve shows food as a normal good. Thus, when income 
rises, the quantity demanded likewise rises for food. Establishing food as a normal good 
is important for future analysis using consumer choice.  
Now that food has been established as a normal good, a consumer choice model 
can be created for low-income consumers who are receiving food stamps. This rational 
consumer choice model shows the consumption decision between composite good “Y” 
and food. In this model, the consumer is attempting to maximize the utility they receive 
from consuming food and composite good Y. This consumption decision can be stated as: 
Maximize U(Y, F) subject to PYY + PFF = M. This adaptation shows a low-income 
consumer’s participation in food stamps. Under the restrictions of the program, citizens 
whose incomes are sufficiently low become eligible for some quantity of food stamps 
(which can only be used to purchase food). The modified budget constraint in Figure 2.1 
shows the effect of food stamps on the model.  
As reported by the FRAC, participation in the FSP is not free. In fact, a significant 
amount of transaction costs are associated with applying for and using food stamps. 
Application fees, time costs, travel costs (i.e. insurance, gas, bus fares, etc.) and complex 
documentation requirements all represent costs of using food stamps. The introduction of 
these transaction costs into the model will decrease the total welfare of food stamps by 
some dollar amount. This loss represents the costs that the consumer incurs to receive 
food stamps. Given that food is a normal good, the welfare recipient will consume less 
food and end up purchasing F2 and Y2, ceteris paribus. This model expands existing 
consumer choice models with food stamps by introducing the effect of transaction costs.  
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The introduction of transaction costs to the consumer choice model illustrates two 
important behaviors. First, this model explains why many low income consumers do not 
participate in the FSP. If the consumer receives $100 worth of stamps but must incur a 
substantial amount of costs to receive that welfare transfer, that $100 is worth much less. 
Thus, the benefits to the FSP may not be worth the implicit and explicit costs of applying 
and using food stamps. The limited real benefit of the FSP may also explain why some 
former food stamp users do not reapply. Once they use the program, they realize the costs 
of transactions with the FSP are too high and see a limited benefit to reapply. Second, this 
model demonstrates the FSP user’s failure to reach the desired amount of food. With the 
introduction of transaction costs there will be an income and substitution effect that 
diminishes the amount of food and Y consumed. FSP participants will only receive a 
level of food F2 and indifference curve I1, which is significantly lower than F1 and I2 
achieved when the consumer did not face transaction costs. Consequently, the 
government’s provision of food stamps does not account for the impact of transaction 
Y 
I1 
   (FS($)–TC) Food (F) 
Y1 
F2 
Figure 2.1 – FSP with Transaction Costs (TC)  
Q of FS 
in $ (No TC) 
F1 
I2 
Y2 
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costs on the consumer. To achieve a greater level of food consumption, the value of food 
stamps would have to increase further to negate the impact of transaction costs on the 
welfare user’s consumption choice.  
 The consumer choice framework can also be applied to nonprofit food assistance. 
In this model, a low-income individual can choose to consume composite good “Y” at 
imaginary price “Y + TC” and food at price “X + TC” with their own income. Again the 
welfare user is assumed to be a rational consumer who is trying to maximize his/her 
utility subject to the constraints of a budget. This model assumes transaction costs are 
already accounted for in the price of goods. As depicted in Figure 2.2, without the 
benefits of the food pantry, the consumer will consume Y1 and FOWN so they maximize 
their utility. If the benefits of the food pantry are added to the model, the price of food 
decreases, rotating the budget line out on the F axis. Since an eligible consumer may 
receive food at a pantry free of charge, the effective price is the costs of transaction. 
However, a food pantry user may only take a restricted amount of food each visit. Thus, 
if a consumer obtained food exclusively via a pantry, their budget line would be kinked 
as in Sub-Figure 1. This kink is caused by the limited quantity of food available for a 
food pantry user at any time period.  
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Despite the restricted amount of food available, the food pantry should greatly 
improve low-income consumer’s food expenditures. Consuming food from a pantry also 
has additional benefits that are not directly shown in the model. When a pantry is used, 
the recipient gets food that he/she may take home and put on the table. In the FSP, the 
consumer must go to the store, determine what goods should be purchased and then wait 
in line. The food pantry eliminates the costs of going to the store and searching for food, 
by giving the consumer food ready for immediate use. However, pantries may also limit 
choice. If all that is available at a certain time period is fruit and beef, a consumer will 
have to take fruit and beef or receive nothing. However, this problem may be avoided if 
the consumer takes the fruit and beef and uses the money saved to purchase their most 
desired good.  
Food pantry organizations also give the consumer exactly what food assistance 
programs want them to have, more food. Unlike the FSP, pantries direct transfer of food 
 
= FFP  
FFP 
Food (F) 
Y 
Y1 
Y2 
FOWN FTotal 
I2 
I1 
Figure 2.2 – Food Pantry Consumer Choice Model 
Sub-Figure 1 
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ensures that low-income families and individuals achieve greater levels of food security. 
This is why Figure 2.2 shows a large increase of food to FTotal. The direct transfer of food 
to the consumer dramatically changes the budget constraint making the optimal 
consumption point at a much higher level of food. This is desirable not only for needy 
households, but for policy makers as well.  
The impact of food assistance programs can also be viewed by using a standard 
utility function. This utility model (Figure 3.1) depicts the affect on a consumer’s utility 
function of participating in food assistance to achieve a desired level of food. The food 
utility model shown in Figure 3.1 assumes a diminishing marginal utility of food. In this 
model, low-income consumers begin with an initial food endowment (F1) which they 
purchase. These individuals can only achieve a food level greater than F1 through food 
assistance programs (food stamps or food pantries) or an increase in income. However, 
participation in either food assistance program or a combination of both is assumed to 
create some level of stigma. A pre-determined base level of food that is desired for low-
income consumers to achieve is represented by F*. In order to reach F*, a consumer may 
purchase the food on their own (possible only by an increase in income), go to the local 
pantry, use food stamps, or utilize a combination of both pantries and stamps. According 
to the model, the manner in which the consumer reaches F* will dramatically affect their 
utility function. In this case, the nonprofit food pantry is assumed to have the lowest 
stigma correlated to its services and thus is the stigma minimizing welfare program for 
the consumer. The food pantry is assumed to have lower stigma because it is more private 
to use, is staffed primarily by volunteer workers, and is funded completely by donations 
instead of tax dollars. Since tax dollars are provided by citizens, certain individuals who 
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resent the use of their taxes toward the FSP may create a stigma effect by harassing 
welfare users or by causing recipients to feel guilty for using public funds.  
 
Figure 3.1 
 
 
An alternative utility function model (Figure 3.2) of food shows how consumers 
respond to the affects of stigma in their decision making process. This function depicts 
that to maintain a constant level of utility, a higher quantity of food much be reached for 
the consumer to participate in food assistance. Stigma may be perceived by the consumer 
or inflicted by the community. Those who purchase their own food and do not experience 
stigma are represented by U(F)O. These consumers only decline in utility comes from 
diminishing returns associated with food. Consumers who experience stigma from 
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participation in welfare are represented by U(F)FP, U(F)FS, and U(F)FP + FS. According to 
the utility functions of those with stigma, greater use of welfare programs will give the 
consumer a higher food level but also an increased feeling of stigma associated with their 
involvement. Thus, welfare participants must receive a high level of food to negate the 
effects of stigma on their utility function. This model may explain citizens who are 
eligible for food stamps yet choose not to receive assistance. If they are targeting a 
certain level of utility (UBAR in this example) the increase in utility from a higher food 
level is negated by stigma. In addition, this model may explain highly stigma sensitive 
individuals or families who reject both food stamps and food pantries. These low-income 
consumers are highly sensitive to changes in their utility levels and the amount of food 
they receive must be distinctly larger than the loss in utility from stigma.  
Figure 3.2 
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Although the consumer provides several insights into food assistance analysis, the 
producer must be analyzed as well. Thus, a simple market model (Figure 4.1) will be 
used. The model of food pantry production assumes that pantries are donative nonprofits, 
relying completely on donations to operate. Due to their reliance on donations, food 
pantries have a limited amount of food assistance available at any given time period. 
Since receiving services from the food pantry requires no monetary payment, the 
effective prices are the transaction costs of using the pantry’s services. Q* represents the 
optimal food assistance output, where low-income families can receive all desired 
assistance. 
Non-Profit Food Pantry Production Model – Figure 4.1 
 
As seen by figure 4.2, the increase in demand and decrease in supply represent 
current market conditions. The current economic crisis and ballooning unemployment 
rate has lowered citizen’s propensity to give. Potential donors are increasingly strapped 
for cash and are less likely to give others food, especially if they have to worry about 
their own food bill. These current conditions are extremely problematic for food pantries 
Q 
S(FP) Food Pantries  
D(FA) Food Assistance  
TC1 
         P=TC 
Q* 
TC= Transaction Costs 
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because they are donative non-profits, relying completely on donations to operate. 
However, a decrease in donations does not mean food pantries will have to shut down, 
but a new equilibrium must be reached. According to the model, transaction costs will 
subsequently rise as pantries implement stricter requirements, recipients have to wait in 
longer lines, or there is less food to choose from. This is particularly significant to food 
pantry users that have special demands (i.e. kosher diet, diabetic, etc.) If pantry recipients 
have to wait in long lines, the amount of stigma associated with food pantry use may 
increase. One of the benefits of food pantries is their privacy; many times an individual 
may go in and out without being noticed, limiting embarrassment or shame. However, 
when that individual has to wait in a long line of strangers or neighbors, the risk of self-
induced stigma greatly increases. A rise in food pantry stigma may ostracize needy 
families and individuals, excluding them from important resources. Thus, current 
economic conditions not only have a profound effect on the ability of a food pantry to 
function, but also upon its mission to care and provide for the less-fortunate.  
Figure 4.2 
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 To reach the optimal production level at Q*, the amount supplied by a food pantry 
at any given time period would have to increase. This would only be attainable through 
government subsidies or a larger donation base. As Figure 4.3 depicts, an increase in 
donations would shift out the supply curve to SFP*, ceteris paribus. Subsequently, the 
market would equilibrate at TC2 where the costs of transactions are essentially 
eliminated. This occurs because there are longer hours of operation, more food is 
available to choose from and the pantry’s storage capacity would expand, reducing or 
eliminating time spent waiting in line.  
 
 
These models show the weaknesses of nonprofit food pantry production. Given 
their donative nature, pantries are extremely sensitive to negative short-run economic 
shocks. As figure 4.2 illustrated, a weak economy may not only increase demand for the 
food pantry’s services, but also may decrease its supply as well. This may make food 
pantries more selective and restrictive, increasing the costs to the needy of receiving food 
assistance. An increase in exclusivity may not only reject needy families but also impede 
Q 
SFP 
DFA 
TC1 
    P=TC  
Q* 
TC2 
SFP* 
Figure 4.3 
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the mission of nonprofit food pantries, which strive to provide the most assistance for the 
greatest amount of people.  
The production model also raises the question of the efficacy of a food pantry. 
Communities where the pantries are most needed are also where they may receive the 
least donations. However, this point is disputed, as strong empirical evidence exists that 
low-income citizens give a larger portion of their income than many other wealthier 
citizens.  
 
Conclusion: 
 
This paper has analyzed U.S. food assistance through the framework of several 
unique economic models. The use of economic theory has explained consumer behavior 
and the weaknesses of nonprofit production. As documented in the literature and seen 
throughout the models, stigma and transaction costs are dynamic influences on 
consumer’s participation in food assistance. Unfortunately, this paper does not analyze 
the utility received from donating to a food pantry or other NPFO. This is an important 
exclusion given the donative nature of food pantries. Studying the impact of donor 
altruism to U.S. food assistance programs may be an important topic for future research.  
Given the arguments presented, this paper recommends that the government 
should increase the tax incentives of food pantry donations for businesses and also give 
small subsidies to pantries. Food pantries rely heavily on donations from grocery stores 
and food distribution plants, yet these donations are slipping under current economic 
conditions. If more businesses were given a strong, unlimited (no cap on donation 
quantity or $ value) tax incentive to donate food and funds, pantries would be able to 
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continue and expand operations. The tax incentive could eliminate the monetary value of 
the donation from the firm’s income statement. Thus, the greater the firm’s donation, the 
larger the tax benefit. Small subsidies (less than or equal to $1,000 per quarter) would 
come in four quarterly payments and limit the pantry’s expenditures to improving 
productive capacity (i.e. food stocks and storage). The subsidy should raise the food 
pantry’s average revenue function and allow for an increase in production. To avoid 
overcrowding and welfare reliance, the food pantry should create a clear set of guidelines 
for potential benefactors. They must be residents of the city in which their food pantry is 
located, unless their city does not have a pantry. Under this approach, pantries would be 
able to operate on a local scale and provide low-income families with their optimal 
amount of food (Q*). This approach improves efficiency by giving the food pantry only 
what it needs. If food pantries were given a specified amount, they could use those funds 
to expand operations as needed. Then, they may be able to meet the heterogeneous 
demand of a local community. The food pantry’s increase in average revenue from the 
subsidy would allow them to expand their buildings and storage, operate for longer hours 
and more days during the week, and allow them to respond to specialized consumer 
demands. This is important, as often low-income individuals or families are unable to 
receive the full or partial provision of their special dietary needs and wants (e.g. kosher 
diet, diabetics, vegans, etc.).  
The FSP should continue to operate, however several changes should be made. 
First, EBT should be given to all food stamp users. The electronic system should reduce 
stigma by increasing the privacy of use. Application forms should be simplified and 
shortened requiring only vital information. Finally, the FSP could lower costs by 
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reducing the benefit computation so that households are only expected to spend about 25 
percent of their resources on food. The funds saved by this reduction could be used to 
supply food pantries with the aforementioned quarterly subsidy.  
In accordance with the models established earlier, this approach should limit 
stigma, maximize consumer utility and enable the needy to increase their food 
expenditures while minimizing the costs of transactions.  
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